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The Collapse of Stalinism

Part one

112. Under conditions of economic disintegration and growing national and ethnic tensions, a new military coup in Russia is possible. Rather than the sclerotic "old guard" associated with the Stalinist past, who launched last August's coup attempt, a new coup is likely to be spearheaded by younger, pro-bourgeois officers, draped in the flag of Russian nationalism. However, despite the enormous confusion that exists within the proletariat, the generals are not confident of the success of such a venture. A powerful factor restraining moves to open military rule is the fear of the masses' reaction, after decades of Stalinist dictatorship. Democratic demands were to the fore in all the mass movements against Stalinism. Despite growing dissatisfaction with the fruits of "democracy", an attempt to crush these tenuous rights could provoke a new movement of the proletariat.

113. At the same time, in conditions of continuing crisis, even without open intervention by the armed forces, the new bourgeois regimes will be forced to resort to more openly bonapartist and repressive measures. These regimes have taken a variety of forms in the different former Soviet republics. In Georgia, the "democrat" Shevardnadze" has been "elected" by the military council which overthrew Gamsakhurdia. In central Asia, barely disguised dictatorships continue to rule. Even where elections have been held, and parliamentary institutions established, a thinly veiled form of bonapartism exists. Yeltsin, for example, is concentrating enormous power in his own hands as Russian President, Prime Minister, and most significantly, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, assuming direct control of the "armed bodies of men". Similarly in Ukraine, Kravchuk has introduced a presidential system modelled on the system of the Russian Tsars, giving himself enormous control o ver parliament and local councils.

114. Therefore, as in eastern Europe, these are regimes of semi-parliamentary bonapartism. Behind the trappings of parliamentary democracy, increasing power is concentrated in the hands of the 'leader', who balances between the contending class forces in society. Trotsky explained this phenomenon, in the period before Hitler came to power in Germany:

"As soon as the struggle of the two social strata - the haves and the have-nots - reaches its highest tension, the conditions are established for the domination of bureaucracy, police, soldiery. The government becomes 'independent' of society." (The Only Road, 1932)

 

115. The increasingly bonapartist character of Yeltsin's regime, was evident during the sessions of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies in April 1992. The opposition to Yeltsin, based primarily on the former hard-line Stalinists were in a majority, but did not use it to block Yeltsin. Most of Yeltsin's demands for greater powers were granted. Much as they denounced the policies of the government, this opposition had no alternative to offer. The bonapartist German chancellor Schleicher once said, "First comes me, then comes my horse, then comes Parliament". Yeltsin's contempt for the 'sovereign' Russian Congress was shown by his failure even to attend after the first day.

116. By their very nature, the current regimes are extremely weak and unstable. This flows from the weakness of the nascent bourgeois class, its tenuous roots in the national economy, and the massive social crisis inherited from rotting Stalinism. Since December 1991 Gorbachev, Gamsakhurdia (Georgia), and Saavisar (Estonia) have all been driven from office. At the time of writing Nabiyev (Tadjikistan) clings on by his fingernails, while Mutalibov (Azerbaijan) has been overthrown twice!

117. Even the Russian regime is inherently unstable as the conflict between Yeltsin and his deputy, General Rutskoi shows. Rutskoi combines attacks on the government's economic policy with strident Russian nationalism. He called for the resignation of the Russian cabinet, after January's massive price rises, complaining that these policies would "push millions of hungry and impoverished people onto the streets". At the same time Rutskoi said, "we have to restore the true face of Russia... We have to revive the glory of the Russian army." In an attempt to silence Rutskoi, Yeltsin has banished him to the 'Siberia' of the agricultural ministry.

118. The Stalinist regimes of proletarian bonapartism, because they developed the productive forces, acquired a certain stability during the post war period. In contrast, there will be no stability on the basis of fledgling capitalism. All the instability of Stalinism in decay has been built into the new bourgeois regimes. Whether open military-bonapartist regimes or weak "democratic" regimes which contain strong bonapartist elements, these will be regimes of crisis.

119. Despite continuing economic chaos, weak regimes of semi-parliamentary bonapartism could stay in power because of the lack of any immediate alternative, either in the form of a revolutionary offensive of the working class or a decisive swing to bonapartist reaction. We have seen this in Poland where a series of weak coalition governments, drawn from the former Solidarity leadership have ruled since 1989, despite a catastrophic economic collapse. However, particularly if the nascent bourgeois felt threatened by a movement of the proletariat, a military coup could again be placed on the agenda.

120. This is possible in Poland in the coming period, where there is growing impatience with the fiasco of a deadlocked Sejm (parliament). Walesa has used the crisis in the Sejm to strengthen his own position, advocating a Gaullist presidential system. Over the heads of president Walesa has forged an alliance with the ex-Stalinist, now firmly pro-bourgeois, officer caste. By proposing new powers, including control of the armed forces and secret police, and the power to use the army in times of "serious internal conflict", Walesa is testing the ground for a possible presidential coup, on the lines of Fujimori's coup in Peru.

121. In Russia and the other republics, military coups are possible on a national basis. But what is ruled out is a coup on the basis of re-establishing the old borders of the Soviet Union. This is because of the break up of the old Soviet state apparatus and the creastion of at least fifteen, separate and increasingly hostile bourgeois states. Of course, after consolidating its rule with Russia, a new military regime could attempt to extend its control into parts of the former USSR. This, however, would only be possible through military conquest, probably basing itself on the support of the Russian minority.

122. As we explained in the IS Majority statement:

"A new military bonapartist regime in Russia or the Union, rather than attempting to re-establish central control and planning, is far more likely to be a pro-bourgeois regime, with the aim of forcing through the transition to capitalism". (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the Soviet Union, para. 64).

 

123. While a move towards a new proletarian bonapartist regime is a theoretical possibility in the future, it is virtually excluded in present conditions. Even if a section of the military favoured a return to Stalinism, and there is no evidence of this, reconstructing the old system would be like trying to put an omelette back into the egg. The old bureaucracy has disintegrated. The new bourgeois regimes are dependent economically and ideologically on Imperialism. Under these conditions, by far the most likely scenario in the event of a successful coup, is a regime of bourgeois bonapartism.

124. Such a regime could even display some of the trappings of Stalinism. There could be a crackdown on sections of the mafia, price controls, attempts to secure supplies, and state control in key sectors in order to stabilise the economy. This would not however signal a return to Stalinist rule. Even Zhirinovsky, the neo-fascist demagogue, argues for the retention of collective farms and large state enterprises.

125. Against the background of a dramatically different world situation, of a catastrophic slump for capitalism, a shift back in the opposite direction is possible. Fearful of a movement of the working class, these regimes could be compelled to take anti-capitalist measures. It is impossible today to say how far this process would go. It is not excluded under certain conditions, as in some ex-colonial countries in the past, that a section of the bourgeois state, leaning for support on the masses, could be driven by the crisis to eliminate capitalism and establish a workers' state in a distorted Stalinist form. But while this is a theoretical possibility, it is clearly not an immediate prospect. Even then, a proletarian bonapartist regime would not acquire the stability of Stalinism in the post war period.

126. The barbaric conditions of nascent capitalism are preparing enormous social explosions in these societies. Profound disillusionment already exists with the immediate results of pro-capitalist policies. A recent poll (May 1992) revealed that only one in six Russians believe the new government is any good at economic management. Less than one in ten were satisfied with the current situation and a mere 4 per cent thought street protests and strikes unlikely in the next twelve months. Reflecting the growing anger, a series of strikes have broken out in the last few months such as the stoppages of oil and port workers, taxi drivers and more recently teachers and doctors. At one point in May, strikes were reported in 35 regions of Russia.

127. As we predicted, within months of their victory over the coup, support for the "democrats" is crumbling. Yeltsin, still the most popular leader, has seen public approval fall from 43% in April to 32% in My. Inevitably, serious splits have emerged in their ranks. Mayor Sobchak of St Petersburg has criticised the Russian government, warning that a "social explosion cannot be prevented" without a change in policies. However, even with disillusionment in the "democrats" and their bourgeois measures rising, this does not mean that illusions in capitalism have evaporated. Here again we see the extremely complex processes at work. Much of the present hardships are still blamed on Stalinism. The fact that striking port workers in Novorossisk, and miners in Vorkuta, have demanded their payment in dollars, indicates that workers still do not see an alternative to capitalism. This is compounded by the absence of a workers' party which could provide an organised expression for the dissatisfaction which is building up. In this situation there can be outbursts of anger which do not necessarily develop beyond the proletariat's current confused outlook.

128. The starting point from which to understand the developing workers' movement in these societies, is a recognition of the effects of decades of Stalinist dictatorship. Not only has the proletariat been disorientated by Stalinism and then by the shock effects of capitalist restoration, it either completely lacks basic class organisations, or these are in a weak and chaotic state. While the first shoots of independent trade unions developed in the closing phase of Stalinist rule, there has not been an immediate movement to develop mass workers' organisations. However, this can change rapidly in conditions of a big movement of the working class.

129. Marxists do not ignore the present low and confused consciousness of the proletariat. But, because of the legacy of Stalinism, there is an explosive contradiction between the latent power of the proletariat in these societies, and the present weakness of their political and trade union organisations. In the Soviet Union, Stalinism created the largest proletariat in the world. In 1988, 73 per cent of Soviet industrial workers were in factories employing more than 1,000. This compares with 25.8 per cent in the United States (1985). Once these workers are forced into action, organisation and consciousness can develop rapidly.

130. Dictatorship acts as an enormous brake on consciousness, but it does not take society back to its starting point., We reject the arguments of pseudo-Marxists who claim that the consciousness of the Russian proletariat has been thrown back to the level of last century. Even today the traditions of October remain alive within at least a section of the working class. These ideas can develop a mass base again in the future, as a result of the cruel experience of capitalist restoration. The working class will become conscious of its role and tasks through the combination of events, experience and the development of the subjective factor by the forces of Marxism.

131. The Russian government has been forced to take account of these realities. It has so far avoided a social explosion against its savage "reforms" by a combined policy of concessions and repression. Moscow bus drivers won a 200 per cent pay increase, but at the same time their strike was banned and their leaders fined for striking. The government have granted big wage concessions, especially to powerful sections like the miners. Wages have been more than tripled in some cases, as partial compensation for the huge price rises. In bonapartist fashion the government has leant on one section of the population and then another. But the deep slump in production and the scale of the price rises has stunned large sections of the proletariat. Reflecting the prevailing mood, that there is no alternative to these measures, most families braced themselves for the price rises, hoarding enormous quantities of essential supplies beforehand.

132. Through harsh experience the masses' illusions in capitalism will be burnt out. But, due to the weakness of the subjective factor, this will be a complicated and protracted process. Events in Poland, however, where the shift towards capitalism began at an earlier stage, demonstrate that the mood of the working class is beginning to change. The strike wave at the beginning of 1992 showed a definite change among large sections of the Polish proletariat. Through a series of bitter struggles, involving hunger strikes and factory occupations, sections of the working class have begun to challenge the pro-capitalist policies of the government. A feature of all these struggles is an increasing preparedness to defend state ownership.

133. Even a year ago, a majority of Polish workers accepted the general idea of privatisation, while invariably opposing privatisation of their own workplace. Now, for the first time, opinion polls show that a majority of the population oppose further privatisation of big companies in general. Only 18 per cent now think privatisation is good for the economy. In 1990 only 45 per cent of the population felt that strikes were a justified form of struggle, whereas today 71 per cent think so. Clearly, a more combative outlook is taking shape, although in the absence of a revolutionary leadership, there is still enormous confusion. The growth of the trade union Solidarity 80, which combines a militant syndicalist programme with nationalism, shows the radicalisation which is taking place but also the confused form it can take without a conscious Marxist leadership. Another indication of this is the growing support among workers for the extreme right, nationalist KPN, which combines calls for a "strong hand" with "left" demagogy.

134. Poland also indicates the shifts that can take place among the middle layers of society. While sections of the proletariat, either through struggle or the threat of it, have wrested concessions from the employers, groups like the teachers, doctors and other public servants have been squeezed hardest by the slump. The schools in Poland have been rocked by strikes, with the formation of organisations like the Union of Starving Teachers. There have even been demonstrations by pupils and teachers against compulsory religious education, reflecting the growing unpopularity of the church, especially among the young.

135. In Russia too, teachers and medics recently came out on strike, winning a 270 per cent pay increase. Paradoxically, these layers, like the students, have been the most pro-capitalist in outlook in the past. In an opinion poll in Russia conducted in February 1992, while 23 per cent of unqualified workers believed Yeltsin's policies were "capable of taking the country out of crisis", 42 per cent of students and 41 per cent of technical intelligentsia agreed. Likewise, when asked whether private ownership could lead the country out of crisis, 38 per cent of unqualified workers and 45 per cent of skilled workers agreed, compared to 60 per cent of students and academics. The squeezing of these layers, with the collapse of funding for public services is undermining one of the principal bases of support for the current regimes.

136. In a number of these countries we have seen a certain movement behind the old official unions. They have the advantage of property, resources and a presence in the factories. OPZZ has developed in this way in Poland, offering greater resistance to the government than official Solidarity, which has attempted to smother workers' opposition. Even Solidarity however, is being forced to change its position, as its call for a two-hour general strike against the government in January 1992 shows. There are increasing pressures within Solidarity, from its factory committees and a layer of its own bureaucracy, to break with the government. In Hungary, MSZOSZ led by ex-Stalinists has also grown and now organises the decisive sections of the industrial workers, in mining, settl and transport. It called the first general strike against the Antall government last December. It is possible in the former Soviet Union too, that the old official unions can develop in this way. Under the pressure of the workers, the Moscow leaders of the official unions, who claim a membership of six million, declared a general strike against the price rises in January.

137. But the situation in the ex-Stalinist states. In Czechoslovakia the old official union federation collapsed with the old regime. The new union federation inherited its assets and property, but has had major difficulties in recruiting in many industries. While they claim over 5 million members, union organisation hardly exists in many areas. The situation in most of the ex-Stalinist countries at the present time is that the bulk of the working class remains unorganised. In some countries it's possible that new trade union formations could arise in the course of struggle.

138. Sections of the old Stalinist bureaucracies are also trying to establish a base for themselves within the working class. In the past the Communist Parties in the Stalinist states were not genuine workers' parties, but an instrument of the ruling bureaucracies. Since the collapse of the old regimes, some of these organisations have continued in existence, retaining the support of former worker members and lower bureaucrats. In some cases new "Communist" formations have either split or been established from the remnants of the old parties, as is the case with Workers' Russia.

139. The clearest case of a former Stalinist party retaining a strong position within the working class is in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia. The Czech Communist Party (KSCM), is still one of the biggest workers' parties in Europe, with 300,000 members. Its ability to mobilise active support is shown by the 50,000 turnout to its May Day demonstration in Prague. In parts of "Red Bohemia", the party still polls 25-30 per cent. Among an important layer of industrialised workers, the party is seen as the only defence against the attacks of the bourgeois. This is despite the muddled bourgeois reformist programme of the party leadership, who criticise the government's policies, but nevertheless fully accept the rationale of the switch to the market. Fundamentally, these leaders are no different from the right wing reformists in the West. An example of this is the party's decision to establish a "Communist" privatisation fund to participate in the government's privatisation programme. Their closeness to the social democratic leaders in the West is revealed in the comments of the Second International, on the KSCM's application join. The leadership were told that they could affiliate, but first they must expel the Marxists!

140. In Poland too, the ex-Stalinist Democratic Left Alliance have gained in support as a result of the government's austerity measures. Again, far from hankering for a return to Stalinism, these leaders model themselves on the reformist leaders in the West and hope to carve out a niche for themselves within the emerging capitalist society. Their rottenness was shown, when in June 1992, they gave their support to the monetarist government of Pawlak. In Russia, while the Communist Party is still officially banned, a n umber of groupings, led by former Stalinist officials, have appeared. Again these leaders, while opposing the policies of Yeltsin, do not stand for the planned economy. In many instances they espouse the worst Russian chauvinist ideas, advocating links with "patriotic forces". However, it is still possible for these organisations to attract a layer of genuine workers, attempting to rediscover the ideas of Lenin and October.

141. In attempting to orientate to the advanced sections of the working class, Marxists must take account of the moods of different layers. A section can be drawn to the old parties, or split-offs, and in these cased the forces of Marxism can orientate their work towards them. But at the same time, other sections of the proletariat are repelled by these parties and their association with the old regimes. In these circumstances it is possible for new working class political formations to develop, particularly in the midst of mass struggles. In the former Soviet Union, for example, it is possible that the demand for a new workers' party will meet with growing support. Marxists therefore have to work flexibly, during certain periods calling for the creation of independent trade union or political organisations, and in others calling for the adoption of the programme of socialism and workers' democracy by the existing workers' organisations.

142. The political disorientation of the proletariat is especially reflected in the leading circles of the current workers' organisations, including the new formations which have developed. Different variants of reformism have arisen, for instance offering a more "social" road to capitalism. Under the impact of events, mass left reformist and centrist currents can develop. However, given the acute nature of the national question in all these societies, nationalism will inevitably also feature in the development of the workers' organisations, and the formulation of their political programmes.

143. The chaos and instability of emerging capitalism is preparing explosive movements and sharp changes of consciousness even though the first reaction has been stunned horror from large sections of the proletariat. The moods of different layers of the proletariat, and especially the youth, can change rapidly under these conditions. International events can have a decisive effect, particularly with the proletariat in the West beginning to assert its role, as has happened in Germany.

144, While it is not yet clearly expressed, there is a growing, hatred towards ascendant capitalism. Without a lead, this can even result in terroristic moods developing among the proletariat and the youth. We have seen this in Poland with a wave of attacks such as the grenade attack on a private health clinic and the fire bombing of Kodak's Warsaw offices. These moods are inevitably reflected in the proletariat too, when it moves into action. At a privatised factory in Gdynia, workers threatened to use explosives to destroy the factory if the riot police attempted to break their occupation. Compounding the problems of nascent capitalism, firearms are widely available in these societies. This is especially so since the breakdown of discipline in the former Red Army led to illicit arms sales throughout eastern Europe and the old Soviet Union.

145. Nascent capitalism in these societies has inherited the unfinished political revolution from Stalinism. They can attempt to foist ex-colonial living conditions on the masses, but despite the present weaknesses of its organisations, the proletariat is immeasurably stronger than the proletariat of the ex-colonial world. The current revulsion towards the labels "Marxism" and "Socialism", because of the crimes of Stalinism, can give way to an equally violent rejection of capitalism and "the market" in the future. Enormous opportunities open for Marxism in the next period if we draw all the necessary conclusions from these processes and orientate our forces correctly.

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