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The Collapse of Stalinism

Part two

1. Despite the decision of the leadership of the former Minority to split away, we circulated and are now replying to their document The Truth About The Coup. This reply should be read in conjunction with other material, especially the IS Majority document Revolution and Counter-revolution in the Soviet Union written in September 1991. Discussion on these issues can only help raise the level of understanding throughout the International.

2. Unfortunately, even from the standpoint of generating genuine controversy, as a contribution to this discussion in our ranks, the long awaited document of the former Minority was a disappointment. From a purely factual standpoint, as we will demonstrate, their document has no claim to the title The Truth About The Coup. Nor does it present any real analysis of the situation in the former USSR. Far from developing serious political ideas, or even reaffirming the "fundamental" ideas of Marxism in this field, the document adopts the shallow, almost trivial approach of a student debating society. Not surprisingly, one of our Czech comrades complained "this document isn't about the Soviet Union, it's about the Majority"! The idea that discussion is a goal in itself, not connected to working out perspectives and a course of action, is the hallmark of sectarianism, not a serious Marxist tendency.

3. Their document, dated 3^rd January 1992, finally arrived at the International centre on 17^th January - almost five months after the coup. It only confirms that the leaders of the former Minority are falling further and further behind events and retreating into a time warp. Despite the advantage of four and a half months to ponder the situation - an epoch in Soviet politics - the most important political developments of that period are not even touched upon. There is no mention of the break up of the Union and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (December 9^th). Similarly, there is no mention of Gorbachev's departure (December 25^th) or the political watershed of Ukraine's independence (December 1^st).

4. In fact, in 24 pages there is not a single mention of the national question. This is an incredible feat. Following the coup, we saw declarations of independence in all fifteen former Soviet republics; developing war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh; civil war in Georgia; and most significantly, the growing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It is impossible to understand events in the former Soviet Union without taking account of the explosive national antagonisms that exist. The authors might respond that this document confines itself to the question of the coup. But the disintegration of the central bureaucracy's hold on the republics was decisive both in provoking and undermining the coup. The tendency to ignore the national question became evident in all the discussions with the former Minority. For them, whether in Scotland, Ukraine or the Baltics, the national question was always relegated to "another discussion".

5. Before dealing with the specific arguments raised in their document it is necessary to deal with the question of perspectives. Despite the now ritual accusations of "Mandelism", "eclecticism" and "empiricism" levelled against us, their document itself says very little about perspectives. Our criticisms of the Mandelists were not primarily because of their mistaken perspectives or 'conditionality' but of mistakes in questions of theory, for example over the class character of eastern Europe after the Second World War; illusions in Tito and Mao; methods of entrism; guerillaism; the role of students etc.

6. In a rapidly changing situation, for which there are no historic parallels, our perspectives of necessity have to ve relatively conditional, especially in regard to the short-term. This approach is anathema to the former Minority whose document states:

"Hiding behind the alleged 'complexities' of the present world situation (what situation is not complex?), and co-called 'conditional perspectives' (what perspective is not conditional?), they put forward a number of different scenarios in every situation, without clearly stating which perspective they defend." (The Truth About the Coup, page 1).

 

7. This is a vulgar misrepresentation of our position. We are not neutral on such questions. We have to decide which way we think events will develop in order to be able to react correctly. Unlike the ex-Minority, however, we believe that when dealing with 'complex' situations ( and some situations are more complex than others), it is necessary to look at all the possible variants at the same time explaining which is the most likely.

8. Trotsky was reproached by the opposition in the American SWP for predicting an attempt by Stalin to 'Sovietise' Finland, as a consequence of the Soviet invasion of 1940. This perspective did not materialise, and in reply Trotsky pointed out:

"A prognosis is not a promissory note which can be cashed on a given date. Prognosis outlines only the definite trends of the development. But along with these trends a different order of forces and tendencies operate, which at a certain moment begin to predominate. All those who seek exact predictions of concrete events should consult the astrologists. Marxist prognosis aids only in orientation. I made reservations several times as to the conditionality of my prognosis as one of several possible variants." (In Defence of Marxism: Balance Sheet of the Finnish Events, page 218).

 

9. Trotsky was prepared to take this heresy even further, arguing that in some particularly volatile situations, it is not even possible to determine which variant is the most likely:

"Every historical prognosis inevitably contains a conditional element. The shorter the period over which this prognosis extends, the greater is this element. In general, it is impossible to establish a prognosis with which the future leaders of the proletariat would, in the future, no longer have need of analysing the situation. A prognosis has not an importance of command but rather of orientation. One can and one must make reservations on the point up to which it is conditional. In certain situations, one can furnish a number of variants of the future, delimiting them with reflection. One can, finally, in a turbulent atmosphere, completely abandon the prognosis for the time being and confine oneself to giving the advice: Wait and see! But all this must be done clearly, openly, honestly." (Leon Trotsky On China: The Chinese Question After the Sixth Congress, page 373).

 

10. The disagreements over method and the approach to perspectives reflect the fact that we have entered a more 'turbulent atmosphere' internationally, especially in the former Stalinist states. As much as the former Minority object (what situation is not turbulent?) this can demand, on occasion, a more conditional approach towards perspectives. Above all, the role of perspectives is to guide orientation, strategy and tactics. Given that we are no longer merely commentators but are attempting to intervene in these events, our forces need to be clear as to what is the most likely development of events. This requires not merely a general historical perspective or the simple repetition of past conclusions, but thorough discussion of the immediate and short term perspectives, which as Trotsky pointed out inevitably have a greater element of conditionality. This in turn requires a recognition of the complexities in the situation so that our perspective is able to guide our activity as accurately as possible. A refusal to adjust to this more demanding approach to perspectives, in favour of simplistic and sweeping predictions, had become the hallmark of the former Minority.

11. The passage from one historical period to another is inevitably reflected within the revolutionary movement itself. Crises and even splits are possible if revolutionaries tempered in an earlier period of struggle are unable to fully absorb the changes taking place and the consequences that flow from them. This law of history explains the breakaway of the former Minority. While their false approach and method became abundantly clear during and after Yanayev's coup, important differences emerged at a much earlier stage, especially in regard to events in the then Stalinist states.

12. Given that the processes in the former Stalinist countries are without parallel in history, it is not surprising that differences over analysis and perspectives should emerge within the leadership. These are not always differences between EG and AW on the one side, and the future representatives of the Majority on the other. Such differences can be clarified by discussion and tested by the subsequent course of events. However, during this period a pattern began to emerge. Each decisive turn of events found the future leaders of the Minority lagging behind. Rather than acknowledging the new features in the situation, their approach amounted to the mere repetition of old and outmoded formulas.

13. In his 1917 "Letters on Tactics" Lenin explained that "Marxism requires of us a strictly exact and objectively verifiable analysis of the relations of classes and of the concrete features to each historical situation... Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to action, Marx and Engels always said, rightly ridiculing the mere memorising and repetition of "formulas", that at best are only capable of marking out general tasks, which are necessarily modifiable by the concrete economic and political conditions of each particular period of the historical process... Bolshevik slogans and ideas on the whole have been confirmed by history; but concretely things have worked out differently; they are more original, more peculiar; more variegated than anyone could have expected. To ignore or overlook this fact would mean taking after those "old Bolsheviks" who more than once already have played so regrettable a role in the history of our Party by reiterating formulas senselessly learned by rote instead of studying the specific features of the new and living reality" (original emphasis). Here Lenin sums up the source of the Minority's mistakes.

14. The root of their mistakes lies in their failure to appreciate the full extent of the collapse of Stalinism. To summarise their position, they accord the remnants of the old bureaucracy a resilience and social weight that it no longer possesses. In effect, they have illusions that the old bureaucracy can defend the planned economy and thereby continue to play a certain historically progressive role. Refusing to recognise the complexities of this situation, invariably EG and AW underestimated the degree of confusion within the proletariat and the extent of illusions in capitalism. The following summary of the contentious issues, shows how this trend reflected itself at each stage in the process.

15. In 1988, in the lead off on Stalinism at the World School, AW said the following:

"Even in the field of labour productivity, which after all is the mainspring of economic progress, astounding progress has been made by the Soviet Union. At the time of the revolution, labour productivity was not much higher than in India at the present time. And while it is not possible to give completely accurate figures, it is clear that the Soviet Union has overtaken the United Kingdom in productivity, and possibly even has overtaken, or caught up with West Germany. It's close at least." He added, "they'll undoubtedly be the first nation to get a man on Mars". (our emphasis)

 

16. In reality, in the mid-1970's, according to a survey by West German economists, Soviet productivity and the main imperialist nations narrowed. One 1985 Soviet estimate was that between 1950 and the early 1980s Soviet productivity had increased from 30% to nearly 6o% of the US average. But from the mid-1970s the rate of increase in productivity declined in each successive Five Year Plan. Between 1966-70 it grew by 32%, 1971-75 34%, 1976-80 17%, 1981-84 13%. Although the amount of constant capital per worker increased by 146% between 1970-84 the average level of productivity rose only by 76%. This gap with Imperialism widened rather than narrowing in the course of the 1980's. Even Pravda in 1985 stated that the goal of the new Gorbachev leadership was to attain the "highest level of labour productivity in the world". If the Soviet Union had "overtaken, or caught up with West Germany" then surely the Soviet bureaucracy would have proclaimed this to the entire world.

17. The completely misleading impression given by AW had to be corrected by BL in his reply to the discussion, provoking a protest from AW. Furthermore in the 1988 World Perspectives document AW and EG implied that only the USA had higher labour productivity than the USSR. Precisely because labour productivity is the "mainspring of economic development" this mistake was very significant. The fundamental argument against the Stalinists' old idea of building "Socialism in one country" was that the imperialist countries dominated the world economy through their higher productivity of labour. Until capitalism was overthrown in the main imperialist centres the threat of counter-revolution in the workers' states, whether they be healthy or deformed, could not be removed. This prospect was removed after 1945 when, for a period, Stalinism was strengthened. But the combination during the 1980s of the economic impasse of most of the Stalinist regimes and the capitalist boom brought restoration back onto the agenda. The ex-Minority however, had an entirely exaggerated idea of the economic position of the Soviet Union relative to Imperialism, right up to the August coup.

18. The seeds of the future disagreement were also seen in the discussion over Afghanistan. Gorbachev's agreement to withdraw Soviet troops was a strong signal that at least a section of the Soviet bureaucracy were prepared to make far-reaching concessions to Imperialism. Alongside the development of an increasingly open, pro-capitalist wing inside the Soviet bureaucracy this agreement marked a significant new stage.

19. In February 1989 a dispute broke out over the meaning of this agreement and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. AW disagreed so strongly with a centre-page article in the British paper, that he intervened to stop the same article appearing in the Spanish paper. No-one else in the IS knew of this censorship at the time. AW and EG console themselves that the perspective of an imminent guerrilla victory over the Najibullah regime, advanced in the article, did not materialise at that time. Then, a critical factor was the stupidity of the Pakistani generals in backing the most extreme fundamentalist group Hezbi-Islami at the expense of the other Mujahedin groups who actually commanded greater support inside Afghanistan. The endless splits and wrangling this produced within the rebel alliance prevented a co-ordinated guerrilla offensive against the regime.

20. But three years later the counter-revolution finally prevailed. In April 1992 the Najibullah regime collapsed as a result of an internal coup. Rapidly the former state machine split and lined up on ethnic lines with rival Mujahedin groups. Afghanistan has been plunged backwards as outright reaction takes over. Any hope of a development of society has vanished as the country further breaks up into tribal fiefdoms. But as in the case of the former USSR and the Balkans this threatens to destabilise the whole region.

21. Prior to the Mujahedin victory, the Pakistani military shifted from Hezbi-Islami to back the more 'moderate' fundamentalist groups. More critically Yeltsin's government cut fuel and food supplies to the Kabul regime. But the changes in the international situation since the USSR's break-up, or since Moscow's 1990 acceptance of German re-unification, were not the only cause of the Mujahedin's counter-revolutionary victory. While clearly these changes have had an effect, they represent a continuation, albeit in a more powerful form, of tendencies within the Moscow bureaucracy which were already developing in the late 1980s. These tendencies towards even greater compromises with Imperialism, and the strengthening of the pro-capitalist wing within the Soviet bureaucracy, led to the deal with Imperialism over Afghanistan.

22. The main point of the debate in 1989 was not the question whether or not the Mujahedin would win a rapid military victory. The question was: Would Afghanistan develop as a Stalinist state, or was the stage set for a victory for capitalism and landlordism? This in turn was intimately linked to an even more decisive issue: Why did Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan? Was this decision taken from a position of strength or weakness on the part of the Soviet bureaucracy? What did it show about the direction the Soviet bureaucracy was travelling in?

23. In the 1988 World Perspectives document, AW and EG wrote the following to explain the Afghanistan agreement:

"In realist, however, Gorbachev has completely outmanoeuvred both Washington and Islamabad. Far from being an expression of weakness, his offer of a Russian withdrawal was a reflection of the confidence felt by the Kremlin that the situation was now more or less under control...

"After nearly a decade of reform, notably in the field of education and women's rights, the Kabul regime now has a firmer basis. Despite the war, there has been a certain development of the productive forces and the introduction of modern amenities, especially in the main urban areas. A new generation of youth has grown up and been educated and trained under the new system, both in Kabul and in the USSR, where they have seen with their own eyes the benefits which a nationalised and planned economy has brought to neighbouring Soviet Central Asia, where Tashkent, Samarkand and Dushanbe are now modern industrial cities. This new generation will not easily give up the ground which has been won or tolerate a return to barbarism under feudal Islamic reaction.

"These are the factors which permitted Gorbachev, in agreement with the Kabul government, to offer 'peace talks' and the withdrawal of Russian troops. In a skilful display of diplomatic manoeuvring, he even initially offered the setting up of a 'government of national reconciliation', with the participation of members of the opposition. Modestly, he even suggested that the Stalinists might accept being in a minority. They would only insist upon hanging on to three portfolios - Ministry of the Interior, Defence and Foreign Affairs - the army and the police!"

Later they continue: "This will not mean the end of the guerrilla war, of course. That can splutter on for years. The Kabul government can live with that, now that it has established itself firmly in power.

"With astounding insolence, Washington has offered not to supply the guerrillas if Moscow agrees to supply Kabul! This 'offer' has naturally been turned down. The Russians know it would never be kept anyway. Both sides will find ways and means of supplying their side with arms and money. But Russia has a clear advantage of having troops stationed in Central Asia, just over the border. If there ever was a serious danger of the guerrillas coming to power - and this is highly unlikely - the Russian tanks would just roll in again to stop it happening.

"The continuation of the war devours a considerable part of the country's resources. This is an unavoidable overhead. But once having established a regime based on a nationalised planned economy, the productive forces will begin to develop. Even under a bureaucratic regime, starting out from an extremely low level of economic development, Afghanistan can make considerable progress. The Stalinist bureaucracy can play a relatively progressive role for a decade or two, before the same contradictions begin to appear which we now see in Russia, eastern Europe and now, to an increasing extent, in China." (World Perspectives 1988, pages 59-60, our emphasis).

 

24. This section, and indeed the entire document, was agreed, with amendments, at the 1988 World Congress. But it soon became clear that this was a complete misreading of the situation. It wholly underestimated the depths of the crisis facing the Soviet bureaucracy - not in Afghanistan - but at home! This was the main factor behind their decision to withdraw. Far from "a reflection of confidence", Gorbachev was increasingly desperate to reach agreement with Imperialism over arms control, to free resources to tackle the growing economic crisis. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was an obstacle to such an agreement which Gorbachev was determined to remove, no matter what the consequences for the Najibullah regime. We are assured that in the event of a guerrilla victory, the "Russian tanks would just roll in again". Yet twelve months later, the Soviet bureaucracy were forced to accept the collapse of their satellite regimes in Eastern Europe - regimes of far greater strategic importance to the Kremlin than the Kabul regime. This process took place despite the large numbers of Soviet troops stationed in these countries. It is one thing to make a mistake when faced with an entirely new situation. It is another thing, in the light of subsequent events, to refuse to recognise and correct this mistake and apply the lessons of this to subsequent developments. To this day, it seems, the leaders of the ex-Minority stand by the incorrect assessment they put forward in the 1988 World Perspectives document.

25. After the first (Mazowiecki) Solidarity government came to power in August 1989, EG insisted on the perspective that Solidarity would not last more than six months in office and then there would be civil war. He argued that Polish workers would never tolerate such a government based on draconian cuts in living standards. In his opinion, events were rapidly heading for a new explosion along the lines of 1980. Other comrades, including some who had recently visited Poland, took issue with EG's assessment. They argued that a much more drawn out perspective was likely, because of the confused consciousness of the proletariat and the absence of a clear alternative from any section of the workers' organisations. Furthermore, they argues that the government's policies had precipitated a devastating economic collapse which could stun the proletariat for a period. On this basis, it was possible that the Solidarity government, in one form or another, could survive for a much longer period.

26. No-one disputed that the policies of the government would inevitably provoke pierce opposition from the working class. Nor was there any dispute that the new government would be an extremely unstable one, and that Solidarity would be faced with growing splits. The disagreement with EG was over his refusal to accept that, in the concrete conditions that existed, the movement would develop in a much more confused and complicated way than in 1980.

27. The Soviet bureaucracy's decision to accede to the capitalist reunification of Germany marked a decisive new stage in the collapse of the post 1945 world balance of power. Faced with a wave of revolutions throughout Eastern Europe; growing internal political, economic and national tensions, and desperate for a deal with Imperialism, the Russian bureaucracy began to give up the strategic gains it had made during the Second World War in return for the promises of limited financial aid from the German bourgeoisie. This historic retreat gave a further impetus to counter-revolution in the whole of Eastern Europe, by lessening the possibility of intervention by the Soviet bureaucracy. This dramatic weakening of Moscow's grip pushed the Eastern European states further into the orbit of Imperialism, especially German imperialism.

28. The mass movement in East Germany began around demands for democratic rights and an end to bureaucratic privilege, with no large scale desire for either emigration, unification, or the market economy. Clearly, these were the first stages of a political revolution. Socialist slogans were common during this period, and by the beginning of November 1989 the Stalinist state machine was suspended in mid-air. In this situation the political revolution could have been completed very quickly and painlessly. As in the early stages of most revolutions, the working class was not conscious of the power which it had. From the beginning the church-influenced liberals, accidentally pushed into leading the mass movement, sought to avoid revolution. They rapidly established "roundtables" to discuss with and try to come to a deal with the "reform" wing of the bureaucracy.

29. This absence of the socialist alternative, of a leadership seeking to carry through the programme of the political revolution allowed the combination of the privileged bureaucracy trying to remain in power, and the lure of high West German living standards to prepare the way for capitalist counter-revolution, in the shape of capitalist re-unification. The unmasking of huge privileges (including access to expensive Western goods) which the bureaucracy tops enjoyed, and the development of a widespread belief that only the West could provide the assistance which the East German economy required, further undermined support for the continuation of a separate East German state.

30. In the autumn of 1989 the bulk of the German capitalists themselves had not initially regarded reunification as an immediate possibility. Kohl's position shifted when it became clear a continuation of political instability in East Germany and development of huge migration to the West would inevitably destabilise West German capitalism. Furthermore, unification presented a historic opportunity for the German capitalists to extend their influence further into Eastern Europe.

31. Initially the Marxists regarded capitalist reunification as an unlikely perspective in the short term. During 1989, it was felt that the immediate threat of counter-revolution in the GDR was likely to have a Stalinist rather than a capitalist character. This view was expressed in the MIR article written in November 1989, which has been held up by the ex-Minority as an example of how the Majority also made mistakes in analysing these processes. The whole tendency, including the comrades who now constitute the Majority, did make a mistake on the question of German reunification. It was not clear how the combination of the absence of the programme of the political revolution, the impasse and demoralisation of bug parts of the ruling bureaucracy and workers' increasing demands for both the removal of the bureaucracy and higher living standards, would provide a mass basis for capitalist counter-revolution. At the time when the MIR article was written there was still enormous opposition to reunification on a capitalist basis. As the article explained, "According to recent opinion polls, 70% of East Germans are against it (reunification). Kohl was booed in Berlin by workers from both East and West".

32. However the situation rapidly and fundamentally changed. Within six months of the revolution beginning the GDR had a pro-capitalist government which was negotiating entry into the FRG. This government had won a landslide victory in the March 1990 Volkskammer election on the basis of speedy reunification providing rapid increases in living standards and the removal of the old elite. While the MIR article did raise the prospect of capitalist restoration and reunification taking place, this was seen as likely over a longer period, should the political revolution fail to be completed:

"unification could be carried through by counter-revolution in the GDR, resulting in the re-establishment of capitalism. Such a perspective has not been posed so far. The overwhelming majority of the masses in the GDR, for the reasons explained, would fight to prevent any attempt at capitalist restoration at this stage...

"However, developments in Poland and Hungary are a warning to the working class of the GDR, should the political revolution not be carried through. The continued strangulation of the economy by the bureaucracy will turn current stagnation into retrogression. Under such conditions, and given the strength of the West German economy, illusions in capitalism could begin to develop, particularly if the working class suffers serious defeats." (MIR Winter 1990)

 

33. This process was far more condensed than we anticipated. As this became clear - especially from the reports of comrades in East Germany - we rapidly corrected our position, early in 1990. This correction also had to take account of the changed situation in the USSR. Gorbachev's acceptance of reunification and a Soviet military withdrawal represented a decisive change in the position since the Second World War. As we have already explained, this reflected the changing balance of forces and growing internal crisis for the Soviet bureaucracy.

34. Mistakes, especially in relation to timing are partly inevitable given that the tendency is dealing with unprecedented phenomena. Provided mistakes are recognised and corrected, serious damage can be avoided. However, in the course of our discussions on East Germany, EG raised completely unrealistic perspectives, which no-one else accepted, of a Soviet military invasion of Western Europe. At the November 1989 European meeting EG said in regard to German re-unification:

"Germany would partially look towards the East under those conditions, to replace Britain and France in the domination of Eastern Europe... Bur in any case that's not the perspective immediately. Russia would not tolerate it. Gorbachev would be overthrown. They didn't wage a Second World War and have a powerful position right in the heart of Europe in order to hand it back to the German capitalists. And therefore Gorbachev would be overthrown, the Red Army would move into Eastern Europe and into Germany using the argument of revanchism. And it's not absolutely excluded, under those conditions, even of a war. Because they wouldn't stop at the borders of East Germany, but would move into the West in desperation. Because an uncontrolled bureaucracy under conditions of crisis - a military regime which would be established under those conditions - could try to solve its problems in that way." (our emphasis.)

 

35. Again, EG completely underestimated the crisis facing the Soviet bureaucracy and its inability to maintain its former grip over Eastern Europe. This perspective was yet another example of a completely mechanical approach. In the past, we had discussed that a military regime in the US, under certain conditions might be prepared to risk world war to crush Stalinism. However, EG was applying this idea mechanically to a completely different situation. As capitalist re-unification proceeded during 1990, not only was this perspective rapidly buried without trace, but no attempt was ever made by EG to explain this mistake.

36. On Romania, the same features appear in the position taken by AW and EG. They under-estimated the degree to which the old bureaucracy would shift to a pro-capitalist position in an attempt to get out of the blind alley created by Stalinism. The National Salvation Front, of former Stalinists, was held to be fundamentally different to the other governments in Eastern Europe, brought to power after the collapse of Stalinism. They believed that the December 1989 revolution, the only violent overthrow in Eastern Europe, and the mobilisations of the miners and other workers in June 1990, were sufficient in and of themselves to prevent capitalist restoration. AW argued that the Front was forced to lean on the working class in order to defend its privileges - implying that this forced them to defend the nationalised, planned economy. Therefore, despite verbal support for market reforms, the Front would not seriously set about introducing them. In mid-1990 AW wrote:

"At first sight, the dismay of the bourgeois at the Front's victory seems hard to understand. After all, the NSF's programme also stands for capitalism, albeit with a "gradual transition", hedged around with conditions to "protect the workers", and leaving certain key sectors, such as transport and defence industries, in state hands.

"Very soon after the elections, the NSF government appointed a 'Minister for Privatisation', one Adrian Severin, who advocates rapid devaluation and a convertible lei in 18 months, the privatisation of small and medium enterprises, and the break-up of big state-owned industries, even at the cost of inflation and unemployment.

"However, the suspicious attitude of the bourgeois towards the NSF is not an accident. They understand that in politics, what is important is not only what is said, but also who says it and for what purpose. That a section of the NSF leaders wants to go back to capitalism is beyond doubt. But the NSF, unlike the National Liberals and the National Peasant Party, is forces to lean on the working class. And the attitude of the Romanian workers to privatisation is clear to everyone." (MIR August 1990, our emphasis).

 

37. As in Poland, AW and EG played down the confused consciousness of the Romanian working class. However, in the absence of a revolutionary leadership, and given the direction the movement against Stalinism had taken elsewhere, enormous confusion and a similar development of illusions in capitalism was inevitable. Significantly, AW's original article did not even refer to this problem. LW as editor, inserted the following statement with AW's agreement...

"The struggle between revolution and counter-revolution may well be complicated and protracted, because of the weakness of the subjective factor".

 

38. Romania was the only area of this work where AW was directly involved, and this mistaken approach inevitably affected the work. Because he did not sufficiently appreciate these problems, almost all those he recruited in Romania, actually had illusions in capitalism, and naturally did not stay in our ranks long. Today, despite clear evidence that the situation has precisely become "complicated and protracted", AW persists with his earlier simplistic black and white picture of the processes involved. Indeed he virtually rules out the existence of illusions in capitalism among the Romanian workers. In The Truth About The Coup we are told...

"The comparison with Romania is entirely false. There it was a case of a movement of the working class, pursuing the classical methods of the proletariat. It was a movement similar to Hungary in 1956. There was no question of going back to capitalism. The movement of the Romanian workers, up to and including the recent miners march on Bucharest were clearly directed against privatisation." (page 9, our emphasis).

 

39. Of course the uprising against Ceausescu was a movement of the proletariat. In that, there is an analogy with Hungary in 1956. But there are critical differences with the movement in 1956, which unfolded under entirely different historical conditions. Presented in this one-sided way, ignoring the disorientating effects on workers' consciousness of four decades of Stalinist dictatorship and the illusions in capitalism that have developed, the comparison with Hungary is completely misleading. If it is a simple question of a movement as in Hungary, employing the classical methods of the proletariat, how do AW and EG explain that the regime which emanated from this movement became one of bourgeois restoration?

40. Certainly the revolution made its mark on the consciousness of the masses. Opinion polls held in late 1991 and early 1992 show that the support for privatisation is lower among the Romanian population than anywhere else in Eastern Europe. But events did not stand still after June 1990. Rapidly Romania, like other former Stalinist states, suffered an economic depression as both central planning and trade with other Stalinist states collapsed. The fact is that, notwithstanding the December 1989 uprising and the June 1990 suppression of the pro-capitalists, Romania had a counter-revolutionary government moving towards restoration.

41. Increasingly, disputes within the leadership surfaced as our work developed in the former Stalinist states, giving us a clearer picture of the situation in these countries. These interventions presented enormous challenges. The work developed under difficult conditions, given the defeat of the political revolution. In this situation, our perspectives required modification. New methods of work and a new terminology had to be improvised in order to take our ideas to the advanced workers and youth. These concrete political problems revealed more clearly than anything else the divergence of method and approach within the leadership. In the past, when we had no comrades in these countries, a mistaken position would have been serious enough. But now when analysis and perspectives are not just for the preparation of cadres in the capitalist world, but precisely a guide to action in these countries, such mistakes could be catastrophic. There is no clearer example of this than the position taken by the Minority towards Yanayev's coup.

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