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The Collapse of Stalinism

Part two

42. The Truth About The Coup opens with a condemnation of "dishonesty" and "systematic distortions" in political debate. But there are precisely the methods the authors themselves resort to. A number of myths are constructed in the document and therefore it is necessary to give an account of the discussions within the leading bodies of the International during and before the coup. On page 1 the document states that "The coup took these comrades (the Majority) completely by surprise. On page 2 we are told that "The perspective of the IS Majority and its supporters in the USSR was that the coup was off the agenda". On page 6: the IS Majority "first argued that a coup was impossible in the USSR"! Yet Majority supporters wrote articles in the British paper which warned of the danger of a coup. The document has an answer for this: "The quotes from the British paper are a smokescreen" (page 2)! How is it possible to discuss seriously on this level? Apparently, the majority wrote these articles warning of a coup as a smokescreen for its real position, that a coup was "impossible"! By this argument, EG's monopoly on predictions of a coup is established. Although it is impossible to find a single article written by him or AW to this effect. Then, as evidence that the Majority opposed EG's perspective, we are told "one of the Majority supporters who is working in the USSR bluntly accused EG of committing an unpardonable error by predicting a coup. This statement was not repudiated or corrected by any of the IS Majority who were present." (page 2).

43. The reason this comrade's statement was not corrected, let alone repudiated, was because he never said it. The incident is pure invention. In reality, what the comrade took issue with was not whether there would be a coup, but EG's insistence that this coup would "out-Hitler Hitler and out-Stalin Stalin". This idea - a return to the mass terror of the past, with upwards of 20 million dead (during a period when Stalinism was still developing the productive forces at a rapid rate) - bears no correlation to the situation today. The document itself scotches the myth that EG alone had predicted a coup. On page 2 it states that:

"throughout this period there was repeated speculation both in the Soviet and Western media about unrest in the armed forces and the dangers of a coup. From a Marxist point of view this was obvious, and no special prescience was necessary to predict it."

 

44. In fact, as they know full well, there was general agreement on the likelihood of a coup at the December 1990 International meeting. During January and February 1991, the Soviet Marxists were on a general state of alert, making the necessary contingency plans in case of a coup. In February the IS decided, with AW and EG fully involved, to cancel a trip by another IS member to the Soviet Union because of the feeling that a coup could be imminent! On August 5^th, just two weeks before the coup, the Soviet Marxists (who apparently believed a coup "was off the agenda") organised a public meeting on The Chilean Variant - What Is It? For this meeting they translated into Russian the video of Pinochet's coup produced for our Chilean campaign. This was in response to the growing clamour for a pro-bourgeois coup, modelled on Pinochet's regime, from sections of the military. This answers the preposterous claim that EG alone had predicted a coup.

45. The document's dishonest method is shown in a string of bogus quotations. Again, the authors seem to believe that by crying 'foul' first they can get away with anything. On page 1 they tell us:

"Not for nothing did Marx and Lenin insist on quoting at length from the writings of their opponents, so as to avoid any possible accusations of distortions or inaccuracy."

 

46. Yet on page 6, in a reference to the IS Majority statement, they say:

"as an additional insurance policy, in their document they added "even if the coup had succeeded it would have collapsed within a few weeks and months".

 

47. This quotation cannot be found anywhere in the Majority document. The use of 'original' quotations, attributed to the Majority, with no reference to the page or paragraph number, is unfortunately not an isolated example in their document.

48. Far from arguing that if the coup had succeeded it would have collapsed within a few weeks or months, the Majority statement actually says:

"In fact, it is almost ruled out that the coup, had it consolidated itself, could have taken society back to the repression of the Brezhnev era. There has been a transformation in the outlook of the working class since the 1960s and 1970s when fear of the regime, at a time when the economy was still advancing, held the workers in a state of inertia. Even with brutal repression the bureaucracy would not be able to instil the same fear in the minds of the masses. Because of this, and their inability to overcome the catastrophic economic crisis, this would have been a weak and unstable regime." (Revolution and Counter-revolution in the Soviet Union, para. 30).

 

49. Today the ex-Minority howl about the "disgraceful lie" of the IS Majority, that their position leaned towards critical support for the coup. They assure their readers "The possibility was never even hinted at by EG and AW" (page 12). This is not true, as is clear from their document. On page 16 they put forward the following perspective for the coup:

"If, as was entirely possible, the regime had been compelled to carry out a policy based on re-centralisation and a planned economy accompanied by terror, that also would have given a certain impetus to the productive forces for a period of time" (our emphasis).

 

50. This perspective - for the re-establishment of the old Stalinist regime based on the planned economy - is a central theme of their document. Their arguments overwhelmingly point to this as the most likely outcome, if the coup had succeeded. If this was the case, what attitude should Marxists have taken towards the regime? AW, in December 1990, replying to a discussion which was dominated by the question of a coup, argued the following:

"Let us be clear, even if there is a struggle between rival wings of the bureaucracy, one wing openly pro-capitalist and another wing - for their own purposes - trying to defend the basis of the nationalised economy, it would be a fundamental mistake to think that we'd be neutral in that situation, even if you had a situation where sections of workers were supporting the other wing."

He continued, "Trotsky said that in principle, you couldn't rule out in advance the possibility of a united front, a very temporary and partial united front, between the Trotskyists and the Stalinist bureaucracy, if it came to an open civil war and an attempt to restore capitalism in the USSR." (AW addressing the International meeting, London, December 1990).

 

51. But as we pointed out in the IS Majority statement:

"there is a fundamental difference in the situation today as compared to when Trotsky was alive. Such is the complete degeneration of the bureaucracy, the collapse of their confidence in the old system of central planning, that capitalism is seen as the only way forward by all significant sections of the bureaucracy in today's situation." (Revolution and Counter-revolution in the Soviet Union, para. 47).

 

52. Because of this decisive change in an abstract and timeless fashion, the general question of critical support was completely misleading. Yet again we see how the leaders of the ex-Minority merely repeat old formulae which no longer apply.

53. The only reason that they are able to deny even "hinting" at critical support for the coup is because it collapsed so quickly. At the time, they refused to take a position openly in the tendency. From the day of the coup, August 19^th, until August 23^rd, EG and AW resisted the holding of an IS meeting. On just one occasion AW broke his silence - on Monday 19^th August in a telephone conversation with German IEC member AB. During this conversation, AW argued that there was a good chance that the coup would succeed in stabilising itself. AB referred to AW's position at the December 1990 meeting, on the question of "critical support". She asked if he thought this was such a case. He replied that if the coup consolidated itself, it would be forced to lean on the planned economy and then Marxists would have to give the regime critical support. He added that at this stage it was too soon to say. Marxists would have to distance themselves from both camps, because there was nothing in the coup leaders' programme that indicated support for the planned economy.

54. What are we to make of this sudden attack of conditionality? Of course it was not possible to predict with absolute certainty the outcome of the conflict. The victory or defeat of the coup depended on many factors that would be determined by the struggle itself - above all the resistivity of the proletariat. But there was no room for conditionality in relation to what position we should take - for or against the coup. This is what AW's position amounted to. The coup had banned demonstrations, strikes and political organisations, and if it succeeded would, according to their own document, introduce a reign of terror! In the face of this clear danger, their position was a recipe for paralysis or worse. What advice would Minority supporters have given to the advanced Soviet workers: Wait and see? If the regime defends the planned economy, we'll 'critically' support it! If not, we've all gone to prison for nothing!

55. Again we see the familiar mistakes in their approach. They completely misjudged the reaction of the working class to the coup, but they also failed to recognise the decisive change that had taken place within the ranks of the old bureaucracy - that this caste of officials and functionaries no longer possesses the same social reserves and no longer plays the same role it played in the past. In evaluating the coup, the programme of its leaders, or even their intentions, were not the decisive factor. As we know, the Emergency Committee had a pro-bourgeois programme which supported "private enterprise" and a "mixed" economy. But even if they had wanted to, the bureaucracy have shown themselves completely incapable of defending the planned economy. As we saw in Romania, the ex-Stalinist leaders of the Front waged a ferocious struggle against the openly pro-bourgeois parties, only then to dress themselves in the robes of the bourgeois counter-revolution.

56. During the coup there was a deathly silence from the Minority leadership. On the first morning, Monday 19^th August, JT asked AW if he would agree to an IS meeting that day, to discuss the situation. AW declined, saying there was "no rush". They complain in the document that "the work of our comrades in the USSR has never been discussed seriously, at the level of the IEC or even the IS" (page 19). And yet AW avoided such discussion on the very day of the coup, when the entire world was looking to events in the Soviet Union. On Wednesday 21^st August, as the coup disintegrated, the British EC met to discuss its special broadsheet. EG and RS of the Minority were asked if they had any disagreements with the contents of the broadsheet or any general comments to make. They both said they had no disagreements with the written material but as they had not had time to prepare for the meeting they did not want to comment.

57. On Friday 23^rd August the IS met. The meeting began with a 40 minute wrangle because EG and AW did not want a discussion on the coup. Again they had not prepared! When the discussion finally took place, they raised no objections to BL drafting a statement on the coup on behalf of the whole IS, implying that they had no real differences with the position of the Majority. Why this extraordinary loss of voice? Even their preoccupation with factional activity doesn't explain it. Clearly, in the swirl of events the leaders of the Minority completely lost their bearings. Had they been confident of their political position, they would have lost no time in mounting a vigorous faction offensive on this issue.

58. Evidently EG and AW had expected the coup to succeed. Again this is not only clear from the discussion with AB, but from their document, which cannot produce one argument for the coup's collapse other than the subjective deficiencies of its leaders. EG was so convinced that the coup would succeed that in conversation, he dismissed the first TV reports of the coup's collapse on Wednesday 21^st August as "lies" and "bourgeois propaganda". Wrong footed by the failure of the coup, they immediately attempted to cover their tracks on the question of critical support. Why go to the wall raising the possibility of critical support for a dead coup? From this point on they shifted from one argument to another in an attempt to justify their position.

59. First, they argued that the working class did not participate in the movement against the coup. Then they were forced to concede that workers took part but they did not act independently. The struggle, we were told, was between two equally counter-revolutionary camps. They prevaricated for months over the question: What concretely should the Marxists have done during the coup? AW advocated a call for "Soviets" (at the Italian Conference, November 1991) while EG said we should have built "separate barricades" (at the IEC, November 1991). At last, with the appearance of their document, they recognise that Marxists should have supported the general strike (page 20). However, just when it appears some progress has been made, the document goes on to say:

"The problem for the Majority comrades however, is not whether we, or they, supported Yeltsin's general strike, but the simple fact that the masses did not support it. And this for the very good reason that they did not trust Yeltsin any more than Yanayev or, for that matter, Gorbachev. And in that, the workers showed an absolutely correct class instinct." (page 20, our emphasis).

 

60. It is hard to imagine a worse tangle of contradictions: They would advocate support for the general strike, but workers would be showing an absolutely correct class instinct to ignore them!

61. Their interpretation of the August events sarcastically dismisses the accounts of the "eyewitnesses" - their former comrades who actually took part in these events. Instead they sift selectively through the bourgeois press and even stockbrokers' reports for quotation, often no more than comment or opinion, to support their claim that the participation of the working class was minimal. Incredibly, they call as a key witness, none other than Francis Fukuyama, who is introduced as "not an ordinary bourgeois journalist, but one of the strategists of capital... This is the sober voice of a serious representative of the bourgeoisie" (page 7). This 'sober' bourgeois is author of The End of History and The Last Man which declares that all human society has converged in liberal democracy, and consequently ideological struggle and history itself have ended! This one example speaks volumes of the 'theoreticians' of the former Minority.

62. Supported by these assorted bourgeois sceptics, the document dismisses the general strike as "a total flop" based on the fact that "the big majority of workers took no part" (page 3). This completely ignores the conditions under which the movement developed. One of the first acts of the Emergency Committee was the seizure of the press, radio and television stations. An atmosphere of fear, chaos and confusion reigned. Small 'details' like the problems of organisation and communication in such a situation are not even considered. These difficulties were amplified in a country the size of the Soviet Union which even their document recognises is "an extremely large geographical area".

63. Most important of all, they ignore the absence of any mass workers' organisations - not even bureaucratised reformist trade unions as in the capitalist world. Independent trade union groups are still at an embryonic stage in the former Soviet Union. In many instances the bureaucrats of the official unions took a pro-coup position and attempted to sabotage any organised resistance. Apart from the mining industry where a network of strike committees had already been established in the course of the 1989 and 1991 strikes, developments inevitably took a confused and chaotic form. Under such conditions, those sections which first began to organise strikes or joined mass walkouts displayed a tremendous audacity and flair for improvisation. Poland and Romania illustrated how movements can develop even where the proletariat has not previously been organised. As we explained, had the coup lasted longer, these spontaneous movements would undoubtedly have gathered momentum.

64. Although at no stage does it tell us how many "spivs, speculators and nascent bourgeois" joined the movement, the document repeatedly demands facts and figures to prove that workers moved against the coup. Thorough first hand accounts were given at the November 1991 IEC meeting by two comrades from the Soviet Union. The comrades' contributions can be found in the appendix. But even the reports in the capitalist press, which evidently the authors place greater trust in, answer completely their claim that "the participation of workers in both strikes and demonstrations against the coup was clearly minimal" (page 3). It is worth examining their allegations in detail. They write:

"Despite claims of the editors, 'from Kuzbass in the south to Vorkuta in the north', there were virtually no strikes. No strikes in the Ukraine, the most important centre of industry, where the problems of the workers are exacerbated by national problems. No strikes in Byelorussia, where a big movement had earlier taken place. Half the miners refused to come out, as did all the oil workers and railwaymen. Little or no response in Moscow. Nothing in the Baltics, the Caucasus or Central Asia." (page 4).

 

65. Throughout Russia, they claim, there were virtually no strikes. Yet in addition to at least half the miners in Vorkuta and the Kuzbass; there were strikes in Sverdlovsk and other Urals industrial centres such as Chelyabinsk; Khabarovsk and Vladivostok in the far east; Krasnodar in the south; as well as in Leningrad and Moscow. In Vladivostok the Pacific fishing fleet, the larges in the Soviet Union joined the strike. In Leningrad, even according to the London Guardian (22.8.91) "20 factories supported the strike". In Moscow, despite the claim of little or no response, but and trolley bus drivers drove their vehicles into the city centre for use as roadblocks against the tanks. In many factories, no formal strike call was issued but workers simply left work to join the demonstrations. Even according to Eduard Shevardnadze in the Observer (1.9.91) "A meeting was called at the Likhachev car factory. Later I learned that every day the workers delegated several thousand men to the defence of the White House".

66. Again no evidence is produced to back up this assertion. We know from the Soviet Marxists that a section of the workforce at the Kiev Arsenal came out on strike and, most significantly, up to half the pits in the Donbass coalfield. The ex-Minority again completely ignore the national consciousness of the Ukrainian masses, apart from a passing reference to workers' "national problems" (!), the only reference in the entire document to the national question. But this was the decisive factor, explaining why the movement against the coup took a different form in the Ukraine. After his initial hesitation, Kravchuk came out against the coup, announcing that the orders of the junta were null and void in Ukraine. At the same time he appealed for calm, against demonstrations and for unite behind the Ukrainian government. Reflecting the unease that existed, Kravchuk was forced to add that "if a state of emergency was declared in Ukraine, the people would have the right to defend themselves." (London Independent 22.8.91). A revolutionary organization in Ukraine would have explained that this course was potentially disastrous. United action with Russian workers was necessary to defeat the coup otherwise, in the event of its victory, Ukrainian workers would be next.

67. In the absence of such an alternative, the mass of workers looked to the Kravchuk government. Even so, the nationalists of Rukh issued a call for "a republic-wide strike" (London Guardian 21.8.91) and gave leaflets to Ukrainian police and KGB units appealing to them to "Make a choice! Stand on the side of the working people. Defend our mothers, fathers, wives and children from putschites." (London Independent 22.8.91). According to the same report "Thousands of jubilant Ukrainians flooded into October Revolution Square in central Kiev last evening to celebrate the failure of the coup."

68. Because they take no account of the national question their comments on the Ukraine betray astonishing ignorance. The document actually states:

"Thus, when the president of the Ukrainian parliament, Leonid Kravchuk took an ambiguous relation to the coup, the Reuters correspondent noted that 'Mr Kravchuk was reflecting the opinion on the streets of Kiev, where Ukrainian journalists reported that many people expressed support for the coup'". (page 5)

 

69. Leaving aside the dubious opinion of the Reuters correspondent, this report is dated 20.8.91, in other words it is commenting on the events on Monday 19^th - the first day of the coup. As elsewhere in the document, time stands still. No account is taken of the changes in mood from day to day and even from hour to hour. If Kravchuk's opinion reflected the opinions of many (how many?) Ukrainians who supported the coup, why was he compelled to declare Ukrainian independence within three days? Kravchuk was forced to shift his position, basing himself on the groundswell of nationalist sentiment that erupted during and after the coup. This was the only way to save his regime. If the mood in Kiev was for the coup - for military rule from Moscow - why did over 90% of Ukraine's population subsequently vote to break from the Soviet Union? Or was the vote for independence an expression of disappointment that the coup had failed?

70. Here again, according to their document, nothing happened and yet the London Guardian (22.8.91) reports:

"Before the coup's collapse, more than 400,000 Estonian workers staged a two-hour general strike. Many enterprises and most public transport in Tallinn stopped work." The same article reports "The Latvians declared a strike early yesterday. This followed the republic's first death of the week, on Monday night. Soviet forces shot dead a driver and wounded his companion".

 

71. The authors' blind spot for the national question, not to mention 400,000 strikers in Estonia (out of a total population of 1.6 million) has again landed them on the wrong side of reality. The situation in the Baltics, like Ukraine, was different to Russia because of mass support for independence. Of course, the mood is very different among the Russian, Ukrainian and other minorities in these states, who now face growing discrimination. During the coup both Estonia and Latvia issued declarations of independence. The general mood of workers was that it was necessary to support these governments who in words were opposed to the coup and continued rule from Moscow. Those strikes that took place, given these factors, took place in support of pro-bourgeois, nationalist governments, not against them. Meanwhile, the cowardly role of these leaders during the coup is shown by the plans of all three Baltic governments to establish governments-in-exile, leaving the workers to their fate. Only the rapid disintegration of the coup saved them from discrediting themselves in the eyes of the masses.

72. The claim that half the miners refused to come out, as did all the oil workers, is deliberately misleading. The following quotations from the bourgeois press show how selective their document is in order to put the most negative interpretation on events. The Financial Times (21.8.91) tells us "in Kemerovo, the administrative capital of the critical Kuzbass field, a spokeswoman for the strike committee claimed 26 pits had already responded to the strike call yesterday (Tuesday)." Their document quotes Reuters' correspondent (22.8.91) who informs us that "In the Vorkuta coalfield of Siberia, only five of the mines were to respond positively to Yeltsin". Yet the London Times (21.8.91( reports that "At least five of the th13 Vorkuta mines were reported to be on strike, others nearly paralysed by absenteeism."

73. As for the "refusal" of the oil workers, the London Financial Times (22.8.91) reports "Oil workers in the huge Tyumen field declare their support but say they will not strike for fear of provoking a civil war." The hesitation among the oil workers, was not out of sympathy or even indifference to the coup, as the document would have us believe. Other sections too undoubtedly held back, watching developments and weighing up the consequences, while clearly opposing the coup. The miners waged a bitter two-month strike in the Spring for Gorbachev's removal, a strike which ended with few real concessions. The document does not even consider the implications of this. In the absence of a clear class appeal, a certain degree of confusion was inevitable given Yeltsin's call for Gorbachev's reinstatement.

74. Incredibly for Marxists, the leaders of the former Minority seem to imply (on page 9) that because many of the Soviet miners' leaders are currently pro-capitalist, their actions against the August coup were automatically counter-revolutionary. As we have explained many times during recent years, the consciousness of the working class in the former Stalinist countries is confused. Often progressive and reactionary ideas are mixed up. The task for Marxists is to separate out what is progressive from what is reactionary and try to develop workers' class consciousness. The miners leaders' support for Yeltsin's policies is reactionary, but this does not mean we support the suppression of the miners' first steps towards independent organisation. Marxists have to fight both in defence of democratic rights and against illusions in capitalism.

75. In the absence of any real workers' organisations or clearly defined leadership, a confused and chaotic development of the movement was inevitable. But even on the basis of the reports in the bourgeois press, anyone whose mind is not closed in advance can see the dynamic of the movement. The heavy battalions of the Soviet working class began to move in the course of August 19^th to 21^st last year. What cut across this movement was not the "refusal" of the working class to struggle, but the ignominious collapse of the coup.

76. Unable to answer the real arguments of the Majority, their document resorts to crude distortions. Where did we allege a "mass movement of revolutionary workers"? (The Truth About the Coup?, page 7). Unlike the Minority, we made a sober and balanced appraisal of these events. In the IS Majority statement we said:

"Without blinding ourselves to the complexities and even difficulties in the situation, we must also recognise the positive features of the coup's downfall. Above all, the coup attempt was smashed by the beginnings of movement of the working class and the youth - the biggest movement since 1917. Faced with a determined movement on the streets, the army and the KGB - already riven with internal divisions - were paralysed" (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the Soviet Union, para. 17).

77. From all our material at the time, it is clear that we took account of the confused consciousness of the proletariat, but also warned against a one-sided approach. This is precisely the mistake the former Minority make. Their document equates "confusion" with "indifference" (headline on page 5). It then adds that "a quite widespread mood of support for or at least acceptance of the coup is not seriously in doubt" (page 5).

78. In this way the authors tell us that "confusion" really means "indifference", which is the same as "widespread support for or at least acceptance of the coup". For them, the obvious has been missed - a lack of clarity over how to fight does not mean workers lack the will to fight. This false approach leads the authors to draw ever more pessimistic conclusions. The end results of which is the monstrous idea that workers' consciousness has been thrown back to the level of 1883, when Plekhanov founded the first Russian Marxist tendency, the Emancipation of Labour Group, in exile!

79. As we explained at the time, Yaneyev and co. miscalculated that Gorbachev's enormous unpopularity would, in itself, ensure the success of the coup. Very quickly after the initial stunned reaction, workers' attitudes hardened when it became clear who had taken control - the "old guard" former Stalinists who were the most despised and hated section of the ruling elite. Workers feared a return to Stalinist repression and the destruction of their partial democratic rights. At the same time the vast majority of workers simply did not believe that the junta was capable of delivering on its promises of wage concessions and action to improve the economic situation. Of all the sections of the old elite they had least confidence in Yanayev and the "old guard". This point is completely missed by the former Minority who argue that dissatisfaction with the economic crisis automatically ensured support for the coup. An opinion poll by MAI East Europe Ltd. conducted in Moscow during and after the coup proves the opposite. On Tuesday 20^th August, the second day of the coup, 57% said they believed the economic situation would get worse, 15.8% said it would improve, and 11% said the coup would make no difference.

80. In the Majority statement Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the Soviet Union we said:

"Had the Emergency committee attempted to hold on for longer, and especially if it had succeeded in getting a section of the state apparatus to open fire on the demonstrators, they would have undoubtedly faced a growing general strike movement and a possible armed uprising as in Romania." (para. 18)

 

81. This idea is ridiculed in the ex-Minority's document which objects:

"The tanks and guns of the Red Army were defeated not by a real movement, but by a potential movement." (page 9).

 

Obviously believing they are onto a good thing, the formulations "potential movement" and "potential general strike" are repeated again and again throughout the document (pages 6, 8, 10, 12 and 14). Evidently they have forgotten that this would not be the first time in history a ruling class or grouping have been forced to retreat for fear of provoking, or to defuse a movement of the working class. In Chile in June 1973, the bulk of the army refused to support a premature coup only, three months later in September 1973, to carry out a successful coup when the conditions were ready.

82. According to the document the IS Majority were the "only people in the world" who believed that, if the coup had attempted to dig in for longer, it risked igniting a Romanian situation. Yet even bourgeois observers raised this possibility. The East Europe Editor of the London Independent (22.8.91) said "the military in Moscow and Leningrad this week held back from a Ceausescu-style slaughter. But that was partly because even they understood the implications of further bloodshed... As Ceausescu's execution proved, the use of uncontrolled violence does not necessarily lead to victory - it merely means that the defeat will be bloodier, when it comes."

83. That this idea should meet with derision serves to underline the ex-Minority's completely undialectical approach. Revolution and counter-revolution are marked by abrupt changes and lightning swings of mood among the masses. Yet there is not even a glimpse of the process in their analysis. The document never makes any distinction between the first day of the coup, and the stunned reaction this produced, with the second and third days in which the demonstrations and strikes gained momentum.

84. In the ex-Minority's version of events, time itself is frozen. While they are forced to admit that different moods existed among different layers of the proletariat - they never attempt to answer in which way these moods changed in the course of events. Even in revolutions it is usually only a minority of workers who actively participate in the concrete actions, although they have the support of the mass. In August, which layer demonstrated the most determination and preparedness to struggle and consequently had the greatest effect on the vacillating layers in the middle? The riddle which is never answered in their document is: In which direction was the movement developing?

85. Our material at the time reflected this process. The British paper (30.8.91) said "when the Soviet workers awoke to find the hardliners in power and Gorbachev under house arrest there was a hesitant response. But as youth began to protest, the working class stirred. The call for a general strike began to get a response." Even bourgeois journalists remarked on this process. The Times (21.8.91) reported "So far, there has been a mixed response from Russian factories. That is partly a matter of organisational delay; strike committees are being formed and meetings held."

86. Our task is to identify the most important features of such a movement and work out how it is likely to develop. In China in 1989 we supported and put forward a programme for the movement in Tiananman Square even though it was initially almost exclusively students. The workers only began to join the struggle in the closing stages prior to the massacre. Our perspective, that if the movement of the youth continued, it would get an increasing echo from the proletariat, was borne out. The movement in China developed more clearly towards the political revolution, but many of the complicating factors which have subsequently developed in all the Stalinist states were less to the fore at that stage.

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