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The Collapse of Stalinism

Part two

87. The idea that significant sections of the proletariat began to move against the coup violates the mechanical schema of the former Minority. How could a movement of the working class, they argue, result in an immediate victory for the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries around Yeltsin? We explained this in the IS Majority statement that:

"Therefore as in eastern Europe we had important elements of a revolutionary struggle by the working class while the general direction of events, given the absence of a revolutionary leadership, is clearly counter-revolutionary. These processes were telescoped into a much shorter time span in the Soviet Union." (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the Soviet Union, para. 23)

 

88. Their document rejects the comparison with eastern Europe as an "astounding proposition" (page 12). However, apart from stating the obvious, that the movements in eastern Europe "did not take place in the same way in every country" (page 12), nowhere do they present any serious analysis of these movements of show in what respects they differ fundamentally from events in the USSR.

89. Even the brief reference in the document confuses the process that took place throughout eastern Europe during 1989-1990 with the Polish movement of 1980. The document states that "in Poland we had a movement of ten million workers, a general strike and the setting up of Soviets" (page 12). Though this is not stated, this is clearly a reference to the movement in 1980, which developed under entirely different conditions. At that stage there was a recession in the West, far fewer illusions in capitalism, and a more conscious desire among the proletariat - which even leaders like Walesa were forced to pay lip service to - for workers' control of the nationalised economy.

90. Under these conditions the political revolution against Stalinism developed in a much more 'classical' form in the sense that a period of dual power existed in Poland and a powerful proletarian organisation was created. One of the most noticeable features of the way in which the revolution unfolded in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the proletariat's failure to rapidly create new organisations. Even with the creation of Solidarity we saw an anticipation of some of the complications which subsequently developed. During 1981 a struggle developed within Solidarity between the Church-influenced current around Walesa, which tended towards capitalism, and an opposition striving in a very confused way towards the idea of workers' management and control. Due to the reformist ideas of the Solidarity leadership, and their attempts to reach a compromise with the bureaucracy, the movement was defeated, though at that stage counter-revolution took a Stalinist, not a capitalist form.

91. By 1989 a different order of forces had come into play. The effects of economic regression under Stalinism, at a time of capitalist boom, compounded by the accumulated effect of decades of Stalinist dictatorship on the consciousness of the working class, enormously complicated the process. In Poland, the defeat of 1981 itself, was a further complicating factor in workers' minds. By this time, large sections of the bureaucracy had moved over to a pro-capitalist position ad they looked for a way out of the impasse. This is the background to the swift development of the capitalist counter-revolution. Is there then, a fundamental difference in the direction in which events have unfolded between eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Characteristically, the ex-Minority's document asserts this without even an attempt at explanation.

92. In East Germany the 1989 mass movement began around demands for democratic rights and against the privileges of the bureaucracy. The 'Internationale' was sung on the early demonstrations and there were no widespread calls for either the market or unification. The demands were, in practice, those of the political revolution.

93. Within a matter of weeks the mass of the East German population was participating in demonstrations. But as in many revolutions, leadership at first fell into the hands of the accidental, petit-bourgeois elements. These liberal reformist, church influenced, "leaders" of the movement were able to prevent it developing a class character and moving to complete the political revolution. This combination of their fear of revolution, and desire for negotiated agreement with the bureaucracy's reform wing, prepared the way for the diversion of the East German revolution onto the road of capitalist reunification.

94. Every revolution develops through different stages. The change in the international situation, widespread illusions in Gorbachev, the comparison between the relatively free 1989 elections in the USSR and the rigged local elections in the GDR, all prepared the ground for the rapid development of the protest movement. The spark was provided by the attempts to reach the West via Poland and Hungary. Once the weekly protest demonstrations began they rapidly gained strength. But the opposition leaders' failure to challenge the bureaucracy at the time of the one million-strong November 4^th mass demonstration, prepared the way for the revolution's diversion.

95. The collapse of the old regime and the granting of some democratic rights, including the right to travel, marked the end of the first stage of the revolution. Without the programme of the political revolution however it was not clear how the GDR could be developed or how the old elite could be removed. The exposure of the luxurious life of the nominally "socialist" elite undermined support for the creation of a new, democratic GDR. Many workers were shocked at the difference between both living standards and the workplaces in West Germany and in the GDR. Large sections drew the conclusion that the East German economy needed help from outside and increasingly saw re-unification as the way out. In addition, the attempts of the old Stalinist bureaucracy to recover their old position, in December 1989 and especially in January 1990, strengthened support for re-unification as the quickest way to remove the old bureaucracy, raise living standards and secure democratic rights. In this way support for capitalist counter-revolution arose because national unification was seen as the fastest possible solution to the problems the working class faced.

96. Part of this process was the intervention of German imperialism to secure re-unification. As the revolution unfolded a debate took place with the German ruling class over what to do. A section called for a strategy towards re-unification from the beginning but the majority of the German capitalists swung over as they witnessed the collapse of the old GDR and the increasing flood of East Germans moving to the FRG. Fearful of possible destabilisation and also seeing the chance of strengthening their position as the major European capitalist power, they moved to take over the GDR as quickly as possible. But the German ruling class was only able to do this by basing itself on pro-capitalist nationalist illusions which the majority of the GDR population had at that time.

97. In Czechoslovakia, we pointed out that the intervention of the working class in the general strike of November 27^th 1989, was the decisive factor which brought down the Jakes regime. 6,000 strike committees were formed throughout industry during this period. Again the movement developed around demands for free elections, an end to one-party rule, and with a fierce hatred of the bureaucracy and its privileges. These were enormously progressive features of the movement from the standpoint of Marxism. With a significant Trotskyist tendency, not even a mass force, it would have been possible to make rapid gains in this situation and establish an important pole of attraction for the future. However, given the absence of a Marxist leadership and the other complicating factors in the situation, the movement was hijacked by the pro-capitalist elements within the bureaucracy in alliance with the former dissidents.

98. The critical difference with events in the former USSR, according to the ex-Minority, is that in eastern Europe there was an independent movement of the working class. Again, no reference is made to what actually took place. In Czechoslovakia, the first and only sections to engage in all-out strike action were the students and actors - "petit bourgeois riff raff" according to EG's definition. A significant section of the students already had illusions in capitalism. They called the general strike and went to the factories to build for it. The general strike itself was limited to two-hours by Havel and the leaders of the Civic Forum. In fact, most workers had already agreed to make this up through unpaid overtime. At that time a similar attitude towards strikes existed in East Germany - where almost no strikes took place at the height of the mass movement - and other countries. The 'Polish example' horrified most workers who equated strike action with economic collapse. This attitude partly flowed from workers' perception that the industries belonged to them. Is the degree of participation in strike action then, the main criteria in assessing such movements?

99. Presumably for the ex-Minority, the general strike called by Havel and the students was more progressive an independent than Yeltsin's. Yet we know that the leaders of the newly-formed trade unions in Czechoslovakia called for "preparations for work in a market economy" in their founding charter. Until the fall of the old regime, the workers' central strike committee had its head office in the Economic Forecasting Institute of Vaclav Klaus - now the monetarist Finance Minister. These realities reflect the confused consciousness of workers emerging from decades of Stalinist darkness. We pointed out at the time that the interests of the working class would inevitably come into collision with these pro=bourgeois leaders. Where is the fundamental difference between this "independent workers' movement" and the Russian miners who at this stage have a pro-capitalist leadership?

100. According to the ex-Minority:

"The (Majority) document ties itself in knots trying to resolve the evident contradiction between an allegedly revolutionary movement of the working class which had produced counter-revolutionary results (page 10).

 

101. But this is precisely what we saw throughout eastern Europe. The mass movement in Czechoslovakia led almost immediately to the pro-bourgeois government of Havel and Klaus. In East Germany, because of unique factors, it resulted in capitalist restoration actually being carried through by Kohl and the German bourgeoisie. Likewise in Romania, although the process took a somewhat different form, we have seen a decisive shift to pro-capitalist reaction.

102. The former Minority seem to have forgotten that revolution and counter-revolution are opposite sides of the same historical process. The "evident contradiction" which they can not come to terms with is precisely the dialectic of this process. Trotsky explained this when he wrote the attempted monarchist coup of General Sanjurjo in 1932. Because of the weakness of the subjective factor, this movement resulted in victory, not for the proletariat, but for the republican bourgeoisie.

"Only if the Spanish workers were strong enough to take power themselves could their intervention in a decisive struggle against the monarchists not have given momentary aid to the enemy, the republican bourgeoisie. In August 1917, the Bolsheviks were much stronger than the Spanish Communists were in August 1932. But even the Bolsheviks could not possibly have won power by themselves in the struggle against Kornilov. Thanks to the victory of the workers over the Kornilovists, Kerensky's government lasted another two months. Let us recall once again that battalions of Bolshevik sailors guarded Kerensky's Winter Palace against Kornilov.

"The Spanish proletariat has shown itself to be strong enough to overcome the revolt of the generals, but too weak to take power. Under such conditions, the heroic struggle of the workers could not help but strengthen - even if only temporarily - the republican government. Only harebrains who substitute rubber-stamp epithets for analysis are capable of denying this." (The Spanish Revolution: The Spanish Kornilovists and the Spanish Stalinists, page 183).

 

103. A similar process can be seen in the events in the Soviet Union. Trotsky's comparison with Kornilov is instructive. When we drew an analogy between workers' opposition to Yanayev's coup and the movement against Kornilov this was ridiculed by the Minority. But just as the Bolshevik sailors guarded Kerensky's Winter Palace, armed workers, youth and Afghan veterans guarded Yeltsin's parliament. The Bolsheviks had no illusions in Kerensky's commitment to 'democracy', and that he would inevitably attempt new intrigues against the working class. But Kerensky, like Yeltsin, was compelled to resist the putsch because the latter was a threat, not just to the working class, but to his own position. For this reason, without sowing any illusions in Kerensky, Lenin and Trotsky advised workers "use Kerensky as a gun-rest. Afterwards we will settle with Kerensky". The critical difference in August 1991 was the absence of a revolutionary leadership and the confused consciousness of the proletariat.

104. In an extremely complex situation like that in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the task of Marxists is to follow attentively all the stages of the process, separate the progressive from the reactionary features and on this basis work out a course of action. This approach has enables us to correctly appraise these movements at each stage. Because they abandon this approach for an entirely one-sided view of the processes involved, the former Minority end up bracketing together all the forces which opposed the coup under the sweeping heading 'Yeltsinites'. They then conclude that any workers that accidentally strayed into the "Yeltsin movement" were "acting, not as an independent class force, but under the banners of pro-capitalist restoration" (page 14).

105. Clearly the dominant feature in August was the counter-revolutionary victory of bourgeois restorationist regimes in the former USSR. Because of the weakness of the subjective factor and illusions in the market, workers' resistance to the attempt to impose a new military dictatorship was derailed behind Yeltsin and the "democrats". Where is the fundamental difference between this and the process in eastern Europe, where again the dominant feature was the triumph bourgeois restorationist regimes? The ex-Minority evidently do not see where their one-sided and mechanical and mechanical approach is leading them. To be consistent they would have to revise altogether their previous position on the movements against Stalinism in eastern Europe. In every case, by the reasoning they apply to the August coup, they would have to conclude that there is "nothing whatsoever progressive" (page 14) in these developments.

106. Unable to see the contradictions in their own position, they lecture us:

"Having been taken completely off guard by events the comrades pushed themselves into a position which meant advocating a de facto bloc with Yeltsin, and the mixing up of revolution with counter-revolution. It is difficult to imagine a more serious mistake for a revolutionary to commit than that." (page 2).

 

107. It is clear from all our material written at the time - nor four and a half months later - that we never for one moment his our implacable opposition to the programme of Yeltsin and the "democrats". Neither did we evade stating clearly and openly that the outcome represented an enormous strengthening of the bourgeois counter-revolution. However, it is another thing to do as the ex-Minority and dismiss the positive features - the beginnings of a movement of the working class; the beginnings of organisation in the factories; the first steps to organise armed defence - and the effects that this had on the consciousness of the proletariat.

108. This position would have completely cut us off from the best workers and youth in the Soviet Union. Their document insists that the workers who took part in the movement did so under the leadership of the Yeltsin wing of the bourgeois counter-revolution. But what did the support for Yeltsin in August signify? The overriding question was the need to defeat the coup. It is simplistic and misleading to argue that this was an endorsement by the mass of workers and youth of Yeltsin's pro-capitalist programme. Even those workers with illusions in the market, and they are numerous, would bitterly oppose the actual measures, price rises and sackings, put forward by Yeltsin. As we have explained before, the current illusions in capitalism are a complex phenomenon. It is not just a question of the desire for economic improvements. Support for, or illusions in the market, are also a reaction to decades of Stalinist tyranny. Fearful of a return to authoritarian rule, many believe that the market is synonymous with 'democracy'. There is a difference between the minority, mostly of the petit-bourgeois and privileges sections, who enthusiastically support a return to capitalism, and a much bigger layer whose 'support' consists of the fact that they do not at this stage see any alternative.

109. The ex-Minority take no account of the conflicting interests that emerged from the very beginning within the movement against the coup. The workers and youth in Moscow who set up 'anti-tank squads' did so independently of Yeltsin, as did the Leningrad workers who formed armed defence squads. Incidentally, there is no basis for the claim that the young Afghan veteran killed on August 20^th was a "middle class intellectual" (page 5). The bureaucrats, students and petit bourgeois were able to avoid conscription during the Afghan war.

110. The pro-bourgeois "democrats" did their utmost to prevent the formation of these armed groups for obvious reasons. In the solidly proletarian Tyshinsky region of Moscow, for example, workers formed self-defence squads and appealed to the White House for arms. They got no response from the deputies barricaded inside the Russian parliament, and so independently decided to block all the approach roads into Moscow. These workers never took a decision to strike, like many others they just came out. The "democrats" began to backtrack on the strike call almost immediately. On Tuesday 20^th August, Yeltsin withdrew the call for the general strike. Sobchak did the same in Leningrad, after reaching an agreement with the commander of the garrison. Those workers who continued to "come out" or were preparing for action up until the coup collapsed on Wednesday 21^st, did so independently of Yeltsin and co. If not for the rapid collapse of the coup, this movement would have increasingly developed, with workers' own demands and initiatives coming to the fore.

111. Rather than us confusing revolution with counter-revolution, it was the ex-Minority who completely failed to recognise the immediate counter-revolutionary threat that the coup represented. Their document argues:

"In the same way, we say that the Soviet workers are very realistic when they see that with Yanayev or Yeltsin "it is the same thing." It is entirely false to say the working class are obliged to take sides "in defence of democratic rights", for the simple reason that the victory of Yeltsin in no sense, shape or form, represents a defence of those rights. Quite the contrary. From the very beginning Yeltsin has acted to restrict democratic rights and move towards government by decree." (page 18).

 

112. This argument contains clear ultra-left dangers, with serious implications not just for the movement in the former Stalinist states but also in the capitalist countries. Of course, now and before the coup, Yeltsin has attempted to assume greater dictatorial powers. His pro-capitalist programme and savage attacks on living standards inevitably brings his regime into conflict with the limited democratic rights of the working class. However, it would have been entirely wrong to place the future threat from Yeltsin on the same level as the actual accomplishment of this task by the coup. Workers understood, even if the former Minority could not, that the coup represented the immediate return to military=police rule and the crushing of the limited democratic rights of the proletariat. In this situation Yeltsin and the "democrats" were forced - out of fear for their own survival - to lean on the working class to defeat the coup.

113. The Minority document argues that:

"If it does not serve to lead to increased living standards and social advancement, 'democracy' becomes an empty legalistic concept for the mass of the population" (page 17)

 

As is often the case, the Minority employ a partial truth in an abstract, timeless fashion which only serves to evade the real issue.

114. Marxists do not regard the struggle for democratic rights as a secondary "legalistic" question. The right to organise, strike, demonstrate etc. are essential for the development of, and clarification of ideas within, a mass workers' movement. Marxists have never rejected the struggle for democratic rights. Such an approach would have been disastrous, for example, in Greece and Spain under the dictatorships. On the contrary, we have always placed ourselves in the forefront of such struggles, at the same time explaining that these rights can only be guaranteed on the basis of the working class taking power. This is the only way to win the movement to Marxism.

115. Characteristically, when faced with a concrete political problem requiring a clear position, the document takes refuge behind generalities and truisms which, while we would not disagree with them, don't actually tell us much:

"Marxists would have no alternative, but to adopt a position analogous to the one taken by Trotsky i.e. a position of implacable class independence." (page 18).

116. Of course we take an independent class position, but what does this mean concretely in the situation that existed last August? They have already told us that the defeat of the coup by Yeltsin "in no sense, shape or form represented a defence of those (democratic) rights." In fact, "Quite the contrary" (page 18). Then does it matter who triumphs? Despite their furious protestations, the logic of their position, behind abstract calls for "an independent class position", is precisely a position of passive neutrality.

117. The dangers of such abstractions were clearly shown in the ultra-left position that the KPD leaders initially had towards the 1920 Kapp Putsch in Germany. Kapp attempted to overthrow the Social Democrat-led coalition government and crush democratic rights. The SPD had dominated the German government since the November 1918 revolution. It had been instrumental in derailing the revolution and bloodily attacking the revolutionary sections of the working class. Faced with the Putsch the Social Democratic trade union leaders called for a general strike. But, reacting to the SPD's leaders counter-revolutionary role, the KPD leaders opposed the general strike.

1118. They declared that this struggle was "between two counter-revolutionary wings... The revolutionary proletariat will not lift a finger for the government that murdered Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. It will not raise a finger for the democratic republic, which is only a mask for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie". The attacks on the SPD leaders' role were absolutely valid. Indeed after the Putsch's collapse the SPD leaders once again supported the bloody suppression of the armed workers' groups that had fought Kapp.

119. But what should the advanced workers have done in that concrete situation? The KPD leaders' abstract position threatened to completely isolate the Communists from the movement and the radicalisation brought about by the Putsch. Faced with a massive general strike and the participation of many KPD members in the movement against the Putsch, the KPD leaders rapidly changed their position and supported the strike although with a confused programme. At least many KPD leaders learnt from their mistakes. Unfortunately the same cannot be said about the authors of the Minority document. In fact the ex-Minority should count themselves lucky that the August coup collapsed before a massive strike movement developed because if it had, the weakness of their abstract position would have been exposed even more clearly.

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